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THE FORGOTTEN PROVISION: HOW THE COURTS HAVE 




Several courts have struggled with the intersection of sexual 
harassment and retaliation, particularly in the situation where an 
employee expressly rejects the sexual advances of a supervisor.1  
Currently, legal scholarship has focused on expanding retaliation claims, 
making the definition broad enough to address that exact situation.  The 
critical flaw in this approach, to be addressed in this Comment, is the 
courts’ failure to realize the full potential of Title VII’s sexual 
harassment provision.  The purpose of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 is to protect employees from discrimination in the workplace.2  
However, the current antidiscrimination framework, as interpreted by 
the Supreme Court, has left employees in certain circumstances 
unprotected.  This Comment seeks to provide an alternative approach, 
namely utilizing § 2000e-2(a)(2) of Title VII,3 to provide relief for 
employees left unprotected by the current antidiscrimination framework.  
Judicial interpretation of Title VII’s sexual harassment provision has 
overlooked the text and language of the statute, culminating in the 
burden being set too high for actual relief.  Using textualism, legislative 
history, intentionalism, and purposovism, this Comment demonstrates 
how courts have under-enforced sexual harassment, and ultimately calls 
for a broader understanding of the statutory regime. 
Part II of this Comment provides a brief background of Title VII and 
an overview of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
antidiscrimination and antiretaliation provisions.  It continues with a 
brief explanation of the various tests adopted and utilized by the 
Supreme Court.  Part III of this Comment analyzes the current circuit 
split over whether the express rejection of a supervisor’s sexual 
advances constitutes protected activity as defined under the 
antiretaliation provision of Title VII.4  Part IV then analyzes how the 
 
             *   Associate Member, 2011–12 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. See LeMaire v. La. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Ogden v. 
Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 2. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2011). 
 3. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).  The text of the statute is laid out infra in Part II(A). 
 4. See LeMaire, 480 F.3d 383 (holding that express rejection is not protected activity); see also 
Ogden, 214 F.3d at 1008–09 (holding that express rejection is protected activity). 
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split can be resolved by reevaluating the current approach utilized by 
many employees seeking relief under Title VII.5  The analysis will draw 
its conclusions from case law and relevant feminist legal theory.  
Finally, this Comment argues that in order to obtain the relief envisioned 
by the drafters of Title VII, employees should bring actions under 
§ 2000e-2(a)(2)6 rather than under § 2000e-2(a)(1),7 the 
antidiscrimination provision, or under § 2000e-3(a),8 the antiretaliation 
provision. 
II. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: A BRIEF BACKGROUND 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the federal 
antidiscrimination statute that prohibits discrimination and retaliation 
based on gender and other protected traits.  Although the various 
provisions of Title VII have been categorized into four distinct 
frameworks, this Comment will focus on the intersection of sexual 
harassment and retaliation.9 
A. The Intersection of Sexual Harassment and Retaliation 
Title VII provides: 
 (1) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .10 
 (2) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer . . . to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants 
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.11 
 (3) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed 
 
 5. Employees currently bring discrimination claims under either the antidiscrimination 
provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), or the antiretaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.  See Part 
II(A) discussing those provisions. 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2011). 
 7. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 8. Id. § 2000e-3(a). 
 9. See Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1), § 2000e-2(a)(2), and § 2000e-3.  The four frameworks, respectively, 
are disparate treatment, disparate impact, harassment, and retaliation. 
 10. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 11. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2). 
2
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any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, 
or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 
subchapter.12 
Although there is not a disagreement over whether the antiretaliation 
provision is separate and distinct from the antidiscrimination provision, 
there is disagreement whether the two antidiscrimination provisions are 
separate.13  However, as evidenced in Part IV infra, legislative intent 
and other statutory techniques reveal that there is no reason to separate 
these provisions.  One legal scholar argued, “[A]n abusive environment 
claim could be identified as a claim of either facial sex discrimination or 
disparate impact.”14  This statement recognizes that the two provisions 
can be read together. 
B. Harassment—Hostile Work Environment 
Hostile work environment claims stem from the language found in 
§ 2000e-2(a)(1), the provision the Court has interpreted to describe a 
claim of disparate treatment.15  Disparate treatment cases have been 
interpreted to require proof of discriminatory intent or motive, and these 
cases typically involve “the most easily understood type of 
discrimination.”16  The Supreme Court, in stating the intent behind Title 
VII in a disparate treatment case, said that Congress required the 
removal of “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment 
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of 
racial or other impermissible classification.”17 
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,18 the Supreme Court interpreted 
Title VII’s primary operative provision19 to permit hostile or abusive 
work environment claims.20  To establish a prima facie case, an 
 
 12. Id. § 2000e-3(a). 
 13. See, e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971).  This case analyzed a sex 
discrimination claim as only affecting terms, conditions, or privileges of employee’s work, thus 
separating § 2000e-2(a)(1) from § 2000e-2(a)(2).  Most courts have followed this interpretation. 
 14. Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 
1449, 1456 (1984). 
 15. See supra text accompanying note 10. 
 16. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988) (citing Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 342, 335 n.15 (1977)). 
 17. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power 
Corp., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971)). 
 18. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2011). 
 20. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66 (holding that a claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment 
is a form of sex discrimination, which is actionable under the Title VII employment discrimination 
statute). 
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employee must prove (1) he or she21 is a member of a protected class, 
(2) he or she was subject to unwelcome sexual advances, (3) the sexual 
advances were because of his or her sex, and (4) the harassment affected 
a term, condition, or privilege of his or her employment.22  The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines were used to 
formulate factors that would indicate a hostile work environment, such 
as unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other 
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.23  The Court went on, 
however, to find that in order for sexual harassment to be actionable 
under Title VII, “it must be sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the 
conditions of employment and create an abusive working 
environment.”24  The current test, despite the broad language of the 
statute, requires plaintiffs to meet the higher burden of proving 
“severe”25 or “pervasive” conduct.26  
Later, the Court clarified the Meritor approach by stating that the test 
requires both an objectively hostile or abusive environment and the 
victim’s subjective perception of an abusive environment.27  To 
establish that the conduct is objectively hostile, courts must consider the 
totality of the circumstances.28  Some of the relevant factors include the 
severity and frequency of the conduct, whether the conduct is physically 
threatening or humiliating, and whether the conduct unreasonably 
interferes with the victim’s work.29  The Court also stated that in order 
for a claim to be actionable, the conduct need not cause physical or 
psychological injury.30 
Although the courts have not explicitly rejected § 2000e-2(a)(2) in 
sexual harassment cases, it appears that most courts rely on the words 
“terms [and] conditions”31 of § 2000e-2(a)(1) to establish a sexual 
 
 21. Although most cases of sexual harassment involve women, Title VII and sexual harassment 
covers both sexes, as well as other protected classes laid out in the statute.  See supra notes 10–12. 
 22. LeGrand v. Area Res. for Cmty. & Human Servs., 394 F.3d 1098, 1101 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. 
denied, 546 U.S. 813 (2005). 
 23. Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 24. Id. at 904. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 904–05.  This case is also relied on by the Supreme Court in their enunciation of a 
hostile work environment claim under Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), discussed 
supra note 21. 
 27. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22–23 (1993). 
 28. Id. at 23. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 22.  It should be noted that while not relevant for this Comment, a claim of sexual 
harassment also involves issues of employer liability, which can be analyzed under the Ellerth/Faragher 
line of cases.  See, e.g., Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2011).  See also supra text accompanying note 10. 
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harassment claim.  Thus, courts have overlooked the potential for 
§ 2000e-2(a)(2) to be utilized in sexual harassment cases and have 
instead labeled that provision  a basis for a disparate impact claim. 
C. Retaliation 
In a retaliation case, the focus is on the employee’s conduct, rather 
than on the employee’s status as a member of a protected class.  
Retaliation claims are brought under § 2000e-3(a).32  The antiretaliation 
provision of Title VII is broken up into two sections: participation 
activity and opposition activity.33  The distinction is that participation 
activity protects employees who participate in investigations or 
discrimination suits, and opposition activity is meant to protect 
employees who oppose illegal discriminatory conduct.  The opposition 
clause is more frequently used in discrimination claims.34  A prima facie 
case of retaliation requires proof that (1) the employee engaged in a 
protected activity, (2) the employee suffered an adverse employment 
action, and (3) a causal connection exists between the opposition 
activity and the adverse employment action.35  The circuit split raised in 
Part III of this Comment discusses the first element, discussing the types 
of activities considered protected under the statute. 
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER WHETHER EXPRESS REJECTION OF A 
SUPERVISOR’S SEXUAL ADVANCE IS A PROTECTED ACTIVITY 
Both the Fifth and the Eighth Circuits have recently ruled on whether 
an employee’s express rejection of a supervisor’s sexual advance is a 
protected activity under Title VII.36  While both circuits come to a 
different conclusion, they both analyze the case under the antiretaliation 
provision of Title VII.  Although the antiretaliation provision provides a 
helpful remedy when an adverse employment action has occurred, the 
circuit split at issue demonstrates that this provision is not helpful when 
an employee’s express rejection is deemed unprotected.  For example, 
an employee will be left unprotected under Title VII when the severity 
of the discrimination does not create a hostile work environment, and 
when the employee’s express rejection does not meet the retaliation 
 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 33. Id. 
 34. For the purposes of this Comment, the opposition clause will be used when in reference to a 
retaliation cause of action. 
 35. Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 978 n.52 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1454 (11th Cir. 1998)). 
 36. See LeMaire v. La. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2007); Ogden v. Wax 
Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2000). 
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provision because it is deemed unprotected.37  The Fifth Circuit’s recent 
opinion shows this gap in protection. 
A. The Fifth Circuit: Express Rejection is Not Protected Activity 
In the 2007 case of LeMaire v. Louisiana Department of 
Transportation and Development, the Fifth Circuit held that express 
rejection of a supervisor’s sexual advance is not protected activity.38  
LeMaire worked as a bridge operator for the Louisiana Department of 
Transportation and Development, the job description of which included 
operating drawbridges and performing maintenance on the bridges.39  
While LeMaire and his supervisor were conversing at work, the 
supervisor made sexually explicit remarks that the supervisor had been 
molested, that the supervisor had molested LeMaire’s friend’s ex-
husband and the friend enjoyed it, and that the supervisor enjoyed being 
close with other gay men who had been molested.40  LeMaire 
immediately asked his supervisor to stop talking about the molestation 
and other sexual interactions and attempted to change the subject.41 
The retaliatory actions that resulted from this encounter included 
derogatory comments by the supervisor to LeMaire, comments that 
LeMaire would never be allowed to transfer and would have to quit, and 
an order from the supervisor to spray herbicide on a large lawn, a task 
that was not within LeMaire’s job description.42  LeMaire believed this 
task was outside the scope of his job duties and therefore left the job site 
to report to his supervisor’s boss.43  LeMaire was told to file an “unjust 
treatment” complaint instead of a sexual harassment complaint, and was 
later told nothing conclusive came out of the company’s investigation.44  
However, he was suspended for two days without pay, which was 
extended to thirty days, and then he was subsequently terminated.45  
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, 
and LeMaire subsequently appealed the Title VII sexual harassment and 
 
 37. See, e.g., Davis, 516 F.3d 955, 978 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 38. LeMaire, 480 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 39. Id. at 385. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.  There was also testimony that comments were made at a later date when the supervisor 
talked about his trip to Mardi Gras and his sexual activities with other men while there, which LeMaire 
was upset about hearing.  Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 385–86.  Conflicting testimony existed as to why the suspension and termination 
decisions were made.  LeMaire’s supervisor claimed that LeMaire was found asleep at the bridge once, 
refused to mow the lawn another time, and was late for work once.  Id. 
6
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retaliation claims.46  The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on 
the retaliatory order to spray herbicide on the lawn noting that LeMaire 
failed to produce evidence that he engaged in a protected activity.47  
Because LeMaire had not yet reported the sexual discrimination at the 
time of the supervisor’s order, the only activity was LeMaire’s express 
rejection.48  On the other hand, the court did find that the reporting of 
sexual harassment is considered protected activity under Title VII.49  
The court stated, “LeMaire provides no authority for the proposition that 
rejecting sexual advances constitutes a protected activity for purposes of 
a retaliation claim under Title VII.”50  The court relied on an 
unpublished Fifth Circuit case determining that the plaintiff produced no 
evidence that express rejection was protected;51 therefore, the Fifth 
Circuit held that an express rejection of a sexual advance is not a 
protected activity.52  Thus, LeMaire had no protection for retaliatory 
actions taken between the time of the sexual harassment and the time he 
reported the incident. 
The court remanded the case to the district court on LeMaire’s sexual 
harassment claim, but made no comment on whether the sexually 
explicit comments reached the threshold of “severe or pervasive”53 
required for a hostile work environment claim.54  Therefore, LeMaire 
was left without any remedy for his sexual discrimination claim at this 
point in the litigation. 
B. The Eighth Circuit: Express Rejection is Protected Activity 
In contrast to the Fifth Circuit’s approach, in the 2000 case Ogden v. 
Wax Works, Inc., the Eighth Circuit held that express rejection of a 
supervisor’s sexual advances is “the most basic form of protected 
 
 46. Id. at 386.  LeMaire did not appeal his assault or intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claims.  Id. 
 47. Id. at 389. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 387.  See also Kasper v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 425 F.3d 496, 502 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 50. LeMaire, 480 F.3d at 389 (citing Frank v. Harris Cnty., 118 F. App’x. 799, 804 (5th Cir. 
2004) (unpublished) (affirming judgment for retaliation claim only when protected activity is “express 
rejection” of sexual advances)). 
 51. Frank, 118 F. App’x. at 804.  In Frank, the plaintiff alleged six incidents of unwanted and 
offensive sexual advances and touching, but the court declined to find express rejection was a protected 
activity, rather plaintiff was only protected after her EEOC filing, which she made after her termination.  
Frank, 118 F. App’x 799. 
 52. LeMaire, 480 F.3d at 389. 
 53. Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903–04 (1982). 
 54. LeMaire, 480 F.3d at 389–90.  The court remanded the case only because defendant’s 
argument was simply to deny that sexual comments were made, and the court found a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the comments were made.  However, the dissent commented it would affirm 
summary judgment because the comments did not rise to the level of severe or pervasive.  Id. at 389–94. 
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activity.”55  The plaintiff, Ogden, was a sales manager for a video store 
and was reportedly sexually harassed by her district manager, Hudson.56  
Ogden claims she was subjected to unwelcome and offensive physical 
advances on three occasions and numerous inappropriate activities and 
propositions.57  Ogden alleged that Hudson retaliated against her 
rejection by criticizing her, screaming at her, and refusing to give her an 
evaluation that affected her ability to get a raise, ultimately forcing her 
to leave work.58 
When the court addressed Ogden’s retaliation claim, the court stated, 
“employers may not retaliate against employees who ‘oppose 
discriminatory conduct,’ and the jury reasonably concluded Ogden did 
so when she told Hudson to stop his offensive behavior.”59  Therefore, 
the retaliatory conduct that happened after she rejected his advances and 
before she filed an internal complaint was protected.60 
In addition, the court concluded that Ogden’s sexual harassment 
claim was sufficient to meet the hostile work environment threshold.61  
The court found “the drumbeat of physical advances, propositions, and 
mistreatment Ogden endured from Hudson for more than a year”62 was 
severe enough to meet the threshold of a hostile or abusive work 
environment.  Therefore, Ogden was protected under both the 
antidiscrimination and the antiretaliation provisions of Title VII. 
C. Other Circuits’ Approach 
Several other circuits have discussed the express rejection issue, 
hypothesized as to how they would resolve it, or refrained from 
discussing it altogether.  The Seventh Circuit chose to remain silent.63  
The court did not rule on whether an express rejection of a supervisor’s 
sexual advances constituted protected activity because no precedent 
existed on the issue, and the court chose not to decide it because the 
 
 55. Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999, 1007 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 56. Id. at 1002–03. 
 57. Id.  Ogden claims Hudson grabbed her waist, put his arm around her, propositioned her for 
drinks and to stay at his home, and also that he inappropriately took an interest in her personal life.  Id. 
 58. Id. at 1004–05.  Testimony varied regarding how management dealt with the retaliation 
claim, but nonetheless the company decided not to discipline Hudson and told Ogden she could no 
longer work for Hudson.  Id. 
 59. Id. at 1007 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2011)). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1006–07. 
 62. Id. at 1006.  The court noted that the relevant factors for the hostile environment claim 
consisted of: frequency, severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive 
utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.  Id. at 1006 
n.9. 
 63. See generally Murray v. Chi. Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2001). 
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employee had not demonstrated an adverse employment action.64  
Furthermore, the court found that the employee’s hostile work 
environment claim also failed because there were only a few sexual 
advances, and she waited too long to complain about them.65  The court 
found that the “[plaintiff] acted in precisely the manner a victim of 
sexual harassment should not act in order to win recovery.”66  A more 
recent Seventh Circuit case acknowledged the circuit split, but again 
chose not to rule on the issue.67  The court stated that even if it assumed 
for purposes of the argument that the express rejection constituted 
protected activity, “[the plaintiff] did not necessarily believe [the] 
behavior was illegal at the time.”68 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision that an 
employee’s claim could not prevail because “even the broadest 
interpretation of a retaliation claim cannot encompass instances where 
the alleged ‘protected activity’ consists of simply ‘declining a harasser’s 
sexual advances.’”69  Again, the employee’s hostile work environment 
claim failed as well.  Although the court found that the employee “spent 
much of her time discussing ‘the parade of horribles,’ there was no 
showing of a substantial adverse result” sufficient to show it was 
hostile.70 
The Second Circuit has also remained silent on the issue.71  The court 
held that whether the express rejection was protected in and of itself 
need not be decided because the retaliation and hostile work 
environment claims were “coextensive” and need not warrant a separate 
award from one the employee might receive for the harassment claim.72 
Therefore, it left the question whether express rejection is protected for 
another day. 
 
 64. Id. at 890.  Although the court stated no precedent existed, the court added a footnote saying 
some district courts had discussed the issue.  Id. at 890 n.2. 
 65. Id. at 889. 
 66. Id. (quoting Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 813 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
 67. Tate v. Exec. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 546 F.3d 528, 532 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 68. Id. at 533.  Believing in good faith that the behavior constitutes sexual harassment has been 
held to be an element of the cause of action.  See, e.g., Fine v. Ryan Int’l Airlines, 305 F.3d 746 (7th 
Cir. 2002). 
 69. Dearth v. Collins, No. 103-204, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47604, at *21 (S.D. Ga. 2005) aff’d, 
Dearth v. Collins, 441 F.3d 931 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Del Castillo v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 941 F. 
Supp. 437, 438–39 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). 
 70. Id. at *29. 
 71. Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 366 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 72. Id. 
9
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IV. SOLUTION: EMPLOYEES SHOULD BRING SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
CLAIMS UNDER § 2000E-2(A)(2) FOR RELIEF 
As the circuit split illustrates, there is much debate surrounding 
whether an employee is engaging in protected activity by merely 
rejecting a supervisor’s sexual advances.  The fault in the courts’ 
analysis, however, comes from the fact that the cases are being analyzed 
under Title VII’s antiretaliation provision.  The difficulty with this 
approach is that it forces courts to cram a particular set of facts into the 
established antiretaliation framework.73  However, sex discrimination 
can take many forms; often, no two instances of sex discrimination are 
alike.  Therefore, the courts are left with the task of fitting complex fact 
patterns into rigid, established frameworks.  When a particular set of 
facts does not fit neatly into a framework, the victim is left without a 
remedy. 
Furthermore, in an express rejection claim, the reality of a workplace 
sexual harassment claim is that it oftentimes blends into a retaliation 
claim.  When an employee rejects a supervisor’s sexual advance, a 
common reaction is that the supervisor retaliates by demoting the 
employee, rejecting promotions of the employee, or terminating the 
employee. 
Some scholars argue that the courts should move away from 
established frameworks altogether and instead return to the broad 
language of Title VII.74  However, another approach is available for the 
courts, and plaintiffs, to utilize in analyzing sexual harassment claims.  
The language of § 2000e-2(a)(2), along with the congressional intent 
behind Title VII and the subsequent 1991 amendments75 envisions an 
alternative way to seek relief.  First, however, it is important to 
recognize why the established frameworks, hostile work environment 
and antiretaliation, have failed to protect plaintiffs. 
A. The Failure of the Current Frameworks 
Sexual harassment claims are largely brought under the framework 
established for hostile work environment claims.76  However, the 
established framework, as discussed in Part II(B) supra, sets a high 
burden by requiring that the discriminatory conduct be severe or 
 
 73. See generally Sandra Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1759458. 
 74. Sperino, supra note 73. 
 75. See infra Part IV(B). 
 76. Barry S. Roberts & Richard A. Mann, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Primer, 29 
AKRON L. REV. 269, 276 (1996). 
10
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pervasive.  Many types of sexual discrimination do not meet this high 
burden, and the victims of sexual harassment are left without redress.  
The rationale behind hostile work environment claims brought under 
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) is that an abusive or hostile work environment 
discriminates against women by affecting the conditions of their 
employment.77  However, the courts have interpreted this to require 
excessive conduct, mainly due to the extreme facts of the cases that 
helped develop the hostile work environment framework. 
In Meritor, the employee was subjected to four years of extreme 
harassment consisting of forty to fifty instances of coerced sexual 
intercourse, sometimes being forcibly raped, followed into the restroom, 
fondled during work, and having her boss expose himself to her.78 In 
another case, a female employee was asked by her male boss to go to the 
Holiday Inn to negotiate her raise, forced to get coins from his front 
pockets, and was asked to bend over in front of him to pick up things he 
would throw on the floor.79 
The above cases are extreme examples of workplaces permeated with 
sexual harassment.  When formulating the framework for hostile work 
environment, the Supreme Court was presented with these examples of 
severe and pervasive conduct.  However, the courts have failed to adjust 
the antidiscrimination framework to fit the changing workplace norms, 
which oftentimes are not as extreme or severe as the original hostile 
work environment claim. 
Around the time that courts were formulating the sexual harassment 
tests, studies conducted on workplace sexual harassment showed that 
85% of women responding to the survey indicated that they were the 
victims of some form of workplace sexual harassment.80  Another poll 
found that nine out of ten working women reported being the subject of 
unwanted sexual advances during work.81  These figures suggest that 
sexual harassment was happening frequently to women in the workplace 
and protection was thus needed.  Current statistics, however, reveal that 
the issue is still pervasive in American workplaces.  According to one 
study, one in six persons responded that they experienced sexual 
harassment in the workplace.82  Of those victims, 43% stated that the 
harassment was from a manager, and only 35% of those victims reported 
 
 77. Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 1449, 1455 (1984); See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2011). 
 78. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986). 
 79. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993). 
 80. Roberts & Mann, supra note 77, at n.13. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Pamela Mahabeer, Sexual Harassment Still Pervasive in the Workplace, AOL JOBS., Jan. 28, 
2011, http://jobs.aol.com/articles/2011/01/28/sexual-harassment-in-the-workplace. 
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the incident.83  A telephone survey conducted in 2008 revealed that out 
of the 782 U.S. workers polled, 31% of females said they had 
experienced sexual harassment.84  Of those victims, only 38% reported 
it, which bolsters researchers’ estimates that typically only 5%–15% of 
victims report instances of sexual harassment.85  These figures reveal 
that sexual harassment is still a problem in American workplaces and 
most of it goes unreported, suggesting a need to reevaluate the current 
test used by courts. 
This is not to suggest, however, that every subjective belief of sexual 
harassment is actionable.  It has long been held that offhand jokes or 
epithets that are offensive to some do not violate Title VII.86  However, 
the current framework does not capture the less extreme instances of 
sexual harassment occupying the middle ground between the conduct in 
Harris and nonactionable offhand remarks. 
For example, a female employee brought a claim that her boss was 
spying on her and others through a peephole in the work bathroom, but 
this failed to meet the burden of hostile work environment because “she 
remained able to perform her employment duties and continued to use 
the restroom.”87  This woman could not recover under the current 
antidiscrimination framework.  However, as will be discussed in Subpart 
B, infra, the plain meaning of the language of § 2000e-2(a)(2) suggests 
that a hypothetical victim in this position should be protected.  The 
woman who was spied on effectively was “limit[ed in her] employment 
opportunities . . . or adversely affect[ed in her] status”88 as an employee 
due to the supervisor’s conduct.  The boss “segregated” that female 
employee because of her sex.  There is no reason this woman should be 
left without protection under Title VII. 
In another case, a woman claimed sex discrimination after her male 
coworker said to her, “I hear making love to you is like making love to 
the Grand Canyon,”89 and the Supreme Court held that “no one could 
reasonably believe that the incident . . . violated Title VII.”90  This 
woman, too, would be left without redress under the current framework. 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, WORKHARASSMENT.NET, 
http://www.workharassment.net/index.php/sexual-harassment-in-the-
workplace.html?tmpl=component&print=1&page= (last visited Sept. 21, 2012). 
 85. Id.  Specifically, researchers estimate that only 5–15% of women report instances of sexual 
harassment.  Id. 
 86. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 
234 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
 87. Cottrill v. MFA, Inc., 443 F.3d 629, 638 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2011). 
 89. Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 269 (2001). 
 90. Id. at 271. 
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In LeMaire, the Fifth Circuit explained that the comments made about 
LeMaire’s friend being molested by the supervisor did not “rise to the 
level of actionable sexual harassment”91 under the burden of hostile 
work environment.  However, LeMaire was limited in his ability to 
perform his job duties because his supervisor had set him apart from 
other workers by telling him sexually explicit stories about one of his 
friend’s ex-husband and saying he would never be able to move up and 
would have to quit.92  These actions adversely affected LeMaire’s status 
as an employee, and thus he should have been protected under § 2000e-
2(a)(2). 
The facts in the above-mentioned cases suggest that the employee is 
not a victim of mere offensive, offhand comments, but that the 
workplace is sufficiently abusive to create an actionable claim under 
Title VII. 
Not only has the hostile work environment framework failed to 
provide relief to the victims of sexual harassment, but the antiretaliation 
framework has also failed. 
The antiretaliation provision is supposed to protect employees based 
upon their conduct, as opposed to their status as a member of a protected 
class.  The courts have traditionally held that conduct such as filing a 
formal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) is sufficient for the establishment of protected activity under the 
antiretaliation provision.93  The EEOC has also stated that making an 
informal complaint to a supervisor is protected activity.94  Other 
established ways to make a protected complaint under the antiretaliation 
provision consist of filing a complaint with a human resources 
department or filing a police report.95  Activities such as these do not 
easily fit the scenario where an employee merely rejects her supervisor’s 
sexual advances when they happen.  Before the employee has filed one 
of the above-mentioned complaints, this provision provides little relief. 
The antiretaliation provision’s failure to protect employees is 
illustrated by the circuit split discussed in Part III supra.  In determining 
whether the express rejection of a supervisor’s sexual advances is 
protected, the courts have analyzed the issue under the wrong provision.  
Attempting to fit the facts into the established antiretaliation provision 
 
 91. LeMaire v. La. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d 383, 394 (5th Cir. 2007) (DeMoss, J., 
dissenting). 
 92. Id. at 385 (majority opinion). 
 93. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that “the parties do not 
contest that Ray engaged in protected activities when he complained of the treatment . . . both 
informally and formally with the EEOC.”). 
 94. Id. at 1240 n.3. 
 95. Mariani-Colon v. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 511 F.3d 216, 223 (1st Cir. 2007) (human 
resource department); Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249, 265 (7th Cir. 2001) (police report). 
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has failed, causing a gap in protection for some victims of sex 
discrimination.96 
However, in a recent Supreme Court case, Crawford v. Metropolitan 
Government of Nashville,97 the Court held that the antiretaliation 
provision protects employees who “speak out against sexual 
harassment.”98  Crawford, an employee, answered questions regarding 
the sexual harassment of another employee during a company’s internal 
investigation.99  The Court began the analysis by using a textual 
interpretation of “oppose” as used in the antiretaliation provision.100  
The Court held the definition of oppose can mean “to resist.”101  
Therefore, the active opposition of sexual harassment by answering 
questions during a complaint is protected by the antiretaliation 
provision.  However, the Court left open the question of whether an 
employee is protected when expressly rejecting the supervisor’s sexual 
advances before an internal investigation has started.102  Given the 
court’s willingness to expand the antiretaliation provision to address 
other discrimination-type issues, the court would probably agree to this 
broad reading. 
However, the problem with using this approach is that a plaintiff’s 
facts in a sexual harassment claim often do not fit neatly within the 
antiretaliation provision.  As shown above, the court analyzes the 
plaintiff’s conduct rather than the employer’s impermissible conduct.  If 
an employer has not taken an adverse employment action, then a 
plaintiff does not reach the protections of this provision.  Furthermore, if 
the courts fail to recognize that express rejection is protected activity, a 
plaintiff is further unprotected by this provision.  This provision is not 
the most effective way to bring a sexual harassment claim, and this is 
yet another example of the courts attempting to force a plaintiff’s facts 
into a rigid, established framework that does not quite work. 
B. The Use of § 2000e-2(a)(2) for Relief 
As exemplified by the failure of the current established frameworks, 
the courts have created a difficult task for victims of sexual 
discrimination in seeking relief.  One of the purposes of Title VII was to 
 
 96. See supra Part III(A) (discussing Fifth Circuit case). 
 97. 555 U.S. 271 (2009). 
 98. Id. at 273. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 276.  The Court stated that since the term was left undefined in the statute they would 
use its ordinary meaning by looking to its dictionary definition.  Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 275–80. 
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eliminate barriers in employment opportunities for protected classes.103  
In order to effectuate this purpose, the courts should utilize both the 
intent and the text of § 2000e-2(a)(2) to provide relief for victims of 
sexual discrimination. 
 The first approach in interpreting congressional intent is to look at 
the text of the relevant provision.104  As discussed in Part II(A) supra, 
the text of § 2000e-2(a)(2) has been correlated with disparate impact 
cases.  The provision states: 
It shall be unlawful . . . to limit, segregate, or classify his 
employees . . . in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual’s . . . sex . . . .105 
Currently, courts focus on the words “terms [or] conditions”106 from 
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) to define what constitutes discrimination.  However, the 
language from § 2000e-2(a)(2) implies there are other ways to 
discriminate against an employee other than the terms or conditions of 
their employment. 
During the debates of Title VII in the House and Senate, some 
legislators commented on the broad understanding of the term 
“discrimination.”  In an interpretative memorandum, Senators Clark and 
Case107 stated that “to discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a 
difference in treatment or favor”108 that is based on a forbidden criterion, 
such as sex or race.  Clark also stated that the text is intended to have its 
common dictionary meaning, except if expressly qualified by the act.109  
Therefore, it can be helpful to look at the traditional definitions of the 
terms used in § 2000e-2(a)(2). 
According to Webster’s dictionary, the definition of “limit” is 
“something that bounds, restrains, or confines.”110  The definition of 
“segregate” is “to set apart . . . or to cut off from others . . . or to 
separate . . . .”111  The definition of “classify” is “to arrange . . . or to 
assign . . . .”112  These terms are broad in coverage and meant to cover 
 
 103. See supra note 3. 
 104. Cf. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92–93 (2003) (court reviewing text of 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 in analysis). 
 105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2011) (emphasis added). 
 106. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 107. Clifford P. Case was a Republican of New Jersey, and Joseph S. Clark was a Democrat of 
Pennsylvania. Herbert Hill, Lichtenstein’s Fictions: Meany, Reuther and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 7 
NEW POLITICS (1998), available at http://nova.wpunj.edu/newpolitics/issue25/hill25.htm. 
 108. 110 CONG. REC. 7212 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1964) (statement by Sen. Clark and Sen. Case). 
 109. Id. at 7216. 
 110. MERRIAM–WEBSTER DICTIONARY 722 (11th ed. 2003). 
 111. Id. at 1125. 
 112. Id. at 228. 
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various types of conduct that could be used to discriminate.  The 
remaining words used in § 2000e-2(a)(2) show the drafter’s intent to 
eliminate broad discriminatory acts.  The provision states that employers 
cannot discriminate in a way that “deprives or tends to deprive,”113 or 
that “adversely affects the status”114 of an employee. 
Looking at the textual interpretation of the provision, it can be argued 
that sexual harassment should be protected against under this section.  
As mentioned in Part IV(A) supra, sexual harassment can take many 
forms and consist of complex fact patterns.  Instead of attempting to 
characterize the facts as severe or pervasive to fit the hostile work 
environment framework, an argument can be made that the particular 
harassment at issue limited or segregated the employee in a way that 
deprived him or her or tended to limit or otherwise adversely affect his 
or her employment opportunities.  Additionally, instead of attempting to 
fit a sexual harassment claim into the rigid antiretaliation framework, 
the victim of sexual harassment would be protected against the 
harasser’s conduct because it limited or segregated the victim from 
employment opportunities on the basis of sex.  As the Supreme Court 
has previously stated, “when a supervisor sexually harasses a 
subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor 
discriminates on the basis of sex.”115  Therefore, under this 
interpretation, the task for plaintiffs would be to demonstrate how the 
alleged sexual harassment limited, segregated, or classified them in a 
way to deprive or adversely affect their status as an employee. 
Textual analysis alone is not the only argument for reading § 2000e-
2(a)(2) as providing relief for sexual discrimination plaintiffs.  
Additionally, the congressional intent behind the 1991 amendments116 to 
Title VII indicates that § 2000e-2(a)(2) can be used for sexual 
harassment suits. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 added new provisions to Title VII that 
have particularly changed the disparate impact provisions.117  First, 
Congress announced that its purpose in amending Title VII was to 
“provide statutory guidelines for . . . disparate impact suits . . . and to 
expand the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide 
adequate protection to victims of discrimination.”118  The guidelines set 
a framework for disparate impact suits and the burden of proof standard 
 
 113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2011). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). 
 116. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2011)). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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was effectuated by adding a new subsection, § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A): 
Disparate impact is established . . . only if: (i) a complaining party 
demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that 
causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged 
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with 
business necessity.119 
The effect of this amendment is that disparate impact claims can only 
be brought under this new subsection, § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).  Therefore, 
§ 2000e-2(a)(2) is left intact by Congress.  Furthermore, Congress did 
not use the same terms as in § 2000e-2(a)(2), such as “limit,” 
“segregate,” “classify,” or “tend to deprive.”  When Congress amended 
other provisions of Title VII, it made sure to strike out the old language 
or to add the new language to the original language.120  Thus, Congress 
purposefully left § 2000e-2(a)(2) untouched, and “when Congress 
amends one statutory provision but not another, it is presumed to have 
acted intentionally.”121 
To align this text with the congressional intent of “providing adequate 
protection to victims of discrimination,”122 courts should look to 
§ 2000e-2(a)(2) to provide relief.  Critics may argue that the word 
“segregate” used in § 2000e-2(a)(2) is meant to redress the racial 
inequities prevalent during the adoption of the Act.  It is well known that 
the initial purpose behind the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to provide 
equality for African-American workers.123  However, the courts have 
stressed that despite the initial use of a provision to address racial 
discrimination, there is no prohibition in Title VII to likewise use it to 
apply to another protected class.124  Additionally, as stated previously, 
the term “segregate” is given its common dictionary meaning of “to set 
apart from others.”125  This definition is broader than racial segregation 
and can be used effectively in the sexual harassment context. 
For example, a female employee subjected to sexual harassment in 
 
 119. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2011) (emphasis added). 
 120. See 42 U.S.C. 1981 § 101(2) (1991) (Congress inserts new language); see also 42 U.S.C. 
2000e-16 § 114(1) (1991) (Congress strikes certain language). 
 121. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 168 (2009) (determining whether or not the 
mixed-motive requirement from Title VII applied to the ADEA when Title VII was amended). 
 122. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2011)). 
 123. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 230 (quoting House Judiciary Committee 
Report). 
 124. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).  The Court drew this distinction 
when addressing that hostile environments were initially meant for racial hostility, but nothing 
prohibited Title VII from protecting against hostile sexual environments.  Id. 
 125. See supra note 112. 
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the workplace is set apart from her coworkers in her treatment by the 
harasser.  She is set apart not only in her treatment by the harasser, but 
also in her ability to perform her job adequately or to continue 
meaningful job opportunities.  Typically, victims of sexual harassment 
are not given the same opportunities to promotions, raises, or positive 
evaluations.126  Title VII was intended to protect against this type of 
discrimination and should be interpreted in a way that would afford such 
protection. 
Using a pragmatic approach to reading the entirety of Title VII, with 
the 1991 amendments, allows the courts to fashion relief for plaintiffs 
left unprotected under the current frameworks.  Disparate impact claims 
have been traditionally used for cases involving statistical disparities 
due to employer’s testing or promotion practices.127  However, three 
provisions other than § 2000e-2(a)(2) provide relief for those claims. 
For seniority or merit-based tests or practices, § 2000e-2(h)128 
provides relief.  In effect, this provision commands employers to make 
sure their testing procedures are not a pretext for intentional 
discrimination.129  For suits alleging preferential treatment, § 2000e-
2(j)130 provides relief.  This provision tells employers that Title VII does 
not force employers to grant preferential treatment to any protected 
group because of any imbalance in percentages of that group in the 
workforce.131  As stated above, the 1991 amendments added § 2000e-
2(k), which now sets out the requirements of a prima facie case for 
disparate impact suits.  Therefore, traditional statistical or testing 
disparity claims are sufficiently protected under other provisions of Title 
VII.  Courts should not read the original § 2000e-2(a)(2) as a nullity. 
C. Legal Feminist Theory and Scholarly Critiques 
Legal feminist theory supports the view that sexual harassment is a 
pervasive problem in American workplaces and continuing change is 
needed.  Not only have labor statistics, referenced in Part IV(A) supra, 
 
 126. See generally Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2000) (after supervisor 
refused to give plaintiff evaluation that would affect her raise, her motivation to perform well at work 
decreased and she was subjected to emotional distress); see also Frederick v. Spring/United Mgmt. Co., 
246 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2001) (sexual harassment plaintiff denied promotions or transfers from 
supervisor who harassed her). 
 127. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (merit-based testing procedures); 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (statistical disparities from subjective hiring 
procedures). 
 128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2011). 
 129. Id. 
 130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2011). 
 131. Id. 
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showcased the failure of the current approach, but legal feminists argue 
that the law itself has not “propelled working women into full 
equality . . . and has severely limited potential as an agent of social 
change.”132  Legal feminists argue that although open discrimination has 
subsided to a certain degree, employers are now subtly discriminating 
against women, mainly due to inherent and structural bias.133  Scholars 
also argue that structural bias typically puts women in lower-level 
positions, thereby increasing the instances of supervisor harassment.134  
Furthermore, since women traditionally experience more sexual 
harassment than men, sexual harassment itself “creates a barrier to 
success that men rarely experience.”135 
Katharine MacKinnon, a prominent feminist legal scholar, views both 
of the sections of Title VII, § 2000e-2(a)(1) and § 2000e-2(a)(2), as 
prohibiting sexual harassment.136  Although her work was written before 
the 1991 amendments, her theory of sexual harassment supports the idea 
that sexual harassment deserves broader legal recognition.  She argues 
“unwanted sexual advances, made simply because [the employee] is a 
woman, can be a daily part of a woman’s work life.”137  The 
consequences of sexual harassment can have an impact on women’s 
work, thus falling within the prohibitions in § 2000e-2(a)(2) of limiting, 
segregating, classifying, or depriving women of employment 
opportunities. 
MacKinnon states sexual harassment makes women feel 
“humiliated . . . embarrassed, and . . . angry.”138  Studies show that 
harassment costs large companies typically $6.7 million each year due 
to turnover, loss of productivity, and absenteeism.139  The study revealed 
that although half the women who were victims attempted to ignore the 
harassment, they tended to lose an average of 10% productivity.140  The 
study concluded that about 24% of the victims took leave time to avoid 
the harasser, while 10% decided to leave their job because of the 
harassment.141 
 
 132. JUDITH A. BAER, WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW: THE STRUGGLE TOWARD EQUALITY FROM 
THE NEW DEAL TO THE PRESENT 68 (3rd ed. 2002). 
 133. Id. at 76–78. 
 134. Id. at 87. 
 135. Id. 
 136. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX 
DISCRIMINATION 6 (1979). 
 137. Id. at 40. 
 138. Id. at 47. 
 139. Pamela Mahabeer, Sexual Harassment Still Pervasive in the Workplace, AOL JOBS., Jan. 28, 
2011, http://jobs.aol.com/articles/2011/01/28/sexual-harassment-in-the-workplace (1988 study 
surveying Fortune 500 companies). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
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These studies suggest the need for a broader reading of the sexual 
harassment provision.  As evidenced by the study, most instances of 
harassment go unreported.  Furthermore, supervisor harassment is a 
continuing problem, revealing why many of the victims most likely fail 
to report the harassment. 
D. Practicalities of the New Approach 
This new interpretation of § 2000e-2(a)(2) should not be a broad, 
open-ended provision for all sexual harassment claims.  There must be 
some limitation.  Following the traditional principles of fairness and 
allocation of burdens, “Title VII actions [should] be tried like any 
lawsuit.”142  Therefore, the plaintiff should retain the burden of 
persuading the court that he or she was the subject of sexual harassment.  
One option for the courts is to follow the requirements of a disparate 
impact claim, thereby requiring plaintiff to point to a “particular 
employment practice”143 as the cause of the sexual discrimination.  This 
requirement aims to prevent statements that the courts are already 
concerned about from becoming actionable, such as offhand comments 
or mere epithets.144  The specific act that a plaintiff claims is sexual 
harassment must also conform to the language of § 2000e-2(a)(2).  An 
actionable claim of sexual discrimination under this interpretation would 
require proof of specific sexual advances, comments, or conduct that 
effectively limited, segregated, or classified plaintiff in a way to deprive 
him or her of employment opportunities or to affect his or her status as 
an employee adversely. 
For example, a supervisor who makes a sexual advance upon a female 
employee would be liable under this interpretation only if the plaintiff 
adequately proved she suffered some form of injury, whether tangible or 
emotional, that limited her employment opportunities or deprived her of 
employment opportunities.  The courts could continue to rely upon the 
Faragher/Ellerth145 analysis for imputing liability to the individual. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The intent behind Title VII, and particularly the 1991 amendments, is 
to provide relief for victims of discrimination.  Sex discrimination is an 
 
 142. Wards Cove Packing Co. Inc., v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 673 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 143. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2011). 
 144. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 
F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
 145. See supra text accompanying note 31. 
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ongoing problem in the workplace,146 and the current frameworks 
established by the courts often do not provide relief. 
Instead of courts attempting to fit the facts of a complex sexual 
harassment claim into the rigid frameworks of hostile work environment 
or retaliation, the courts should look to the language of § 2000e-2(a)(2) 
as an alternative way to provide relief.  Using a pragmatic approach that 
looks to both the text and congressional intent, courts should recognize 
that Congress has intentionally left § 2000e-2(a)(2) as part of Title VII 
and that it is intended to be functional for victims of discrimination.  
With the use of a pragmatic approach such as this, there can be hope that 
eventually victims of sexual harassment who do not meet the 
requirements of the other established frameworks will at last have relief. 
 
 146. See supra notes 81–83. 
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